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[4] Jaegwon Kim, 'Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables', American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978) 149-56.
[5] Jaegwon Kim, 'Concepts of Supervenience ', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1984) Suppose you know that you will get your degree jus pass the final exam. You currently neither believe n that you will get the degree, but you do nonetheless h that you will pass the exam. You know that you have and that there is relatively little that you do not und moreover you yourself would concede, at least if time to think about it, that this makes it likely that and thus get your degree.
So far there's nothing particularly unusual about t just another case in which you fail to believe a pro which you have good evidence. But now, add this wr attempt to teach you humility, your examiners will alter making it much more difficult, if you come to believe t get your degree. Indeed, they will make the exam so d you will be unlikely to pass. Moreover, the examiner anticipate your belief, and thus they are able to ensur come to believe that you will get your degree, the o belief and the alteration of the exam will be simultan suppose you know all of this. You know that the exa prepared to act in this way. ' Then you are in a bind. 2Analogous problems arise with respect to intentions, plannings, choosings, tryings, and the like. Ordinarily, if you now have reasons to do X at some later time, you also now have reasons to form an intention to do X at that time. There are exceptions, however. The intention itself might undercut your reasons for doing X and hence your reasons for intending it. For example, you might have adequate reasons to confront your bosses tomorrow with your suspicions of the firm's illegal dealings even though you know that if you were now to form an intention to do so, this would make you nervous. You might also know that when you are nervous, you have a tendency to be insulting and that this in turn is likely to make your bosses defiant and hence even less willing than they are now to look into the matter.
In so far as your goal is rational for you to take t your degree? Is it rational hold on this proposition?
It's hard to say. None of If you disbelieve the pro won't get the degree -y realize is unlikely to be believing that you will get to believe this, the exam w that you will get the deg ing something that you r ing option is to withhold will get the degree, but t then be withholding on a be true.
Thus, insofar as your ends are epistemic, you really are in a bind. There isn't much to choose among the three optionsbelieving, disbelieving, and withholding.3 Appealing to other ends may help some. In particular, you do have pragmatic reasons not to believe that you will get the degree, since believing this is likely to have undesirable consequences. It is likely to result in your not getting the degree. So, this would seem to favour not believing over believing.
Still, the main point here has nothing to do with non-epistemic reasons for belief. The point is that believing that you will get the degree would be epistemically undesirable, despite the fact that you have adequate evidence for the truth of this proposition. It would be a belief that is unlikely to be true, given what your evidence would be." This is an important point for epistemology. It illustrates that evidence for the truth of a proposition, however exactly we con-'Similar puzzles can be generated for degrees of belief. So, the problems here cannot be avoided by opting to do epistemology in terms of degrees of belief rather than beliefs simpliciter.
4Ordinarily, if you become convinced that you have good evidence for a proposition, this is enough to prompt belief in it, but the above situation is one of the exceptions to this general rule. One way of illustrating this is to suppose that it is not an exception. Then the moment you become convinced that, given your current situation, you are likely to get your degree, you will come to believe that you will get your degree. But then, at the next moment, assuming that you are aware of this belief, you will realize that you are now likely not to get your degree and hence you will come to believe this instead. Moreover, matters won't stabilize there. Like a yo-yo, you will continue to vacillate between belief and disbelief until either the exam is given or exhaustion sets in. The alternative and more plausible suggestion is that in this kind of situation, where you are fully aware of your predicament, you might not believe that you will get the degree. You might not believe this proposition despite your being convinced that you have good evidence for it. For a contrasting view, see Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) , Chapter 1, who argues that believing that P likely to be true is equivalent to believing P. strue evidence, need not invariably generate a cor reason to believe the proposition. This is so becaus accordance with the evidence might itself eliminate the The reverse is also possible. Belief against the evidenc create evidence, as is the case with some kinds of self beliefs. Consider another exam case. Suppose you d strong evidence for thinking that you will pass the evidence indicates that your current chances of passin the same as your chances of failing. However, you kn were to believe that you will pass, this would increase dence, and you also know that if you were confident, do much better on the exam. Indeed, you would do we to pass.
Here again, evidence and reasons for belief come apart, only from the other direction. You currently lack adequate evidence for the proposition that you will pass but nonetheless have a reason to believe it, and not just a pragmatic reason. Believing this proposition is defensible insofar as your goal is to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs. You yourself realize that in believing that you will pass, you would be believing a proposition that is likely to be true.6
On the other hand, it is also episternically desirable to withhold on the proposition that you will pass the exam. After all, you realize that your current chances of passing are only about 50-50, and you realize also that if you withhold judgement on whether or not you will pass, these chances won't be altered. So, with respect to your epistemic ends, there is nothing to choose between withholding and believing. If you were to believe, then believing would be the best option. But equally, if you were to withhold, withholding would be the best option.
Is there something to choose between these two options if we take into consideration your non-epistemic ends? Perhaps, but even here there are considerations on both sides. Since passing the exam is important to you and since believing that you will pass 'Let p be the proposition that you have never thought the proposition that 252 = 625, and suppose that you have adequate evidence for p -perhaps, e.g., you know that you have never tried to square any number greater than 15. This is another kind of case in which belief in accordance with the evidence might eliminate that evidence (since believing p itself involves thinking the proposition 252 = 625).
6Once again, similar problems arise with respect to intentions, plannings, choosings, tryings, and the like. Ordinarily, you now have reasons to form an intention to do X at some later time only if you now have reasons to do X at that time. There are exceptions, however. Think of cases in which the intention to do X will produce benefits even if you don't do X. Here is an extreme example: someone offers you a million dollars if tomorrow you form an intention to drink a toxin on the day after tomorrow; if you form the intention tomorrow, you will get the money whether or not you actually drink the toxin on the day after tomorrow.
(This is Gregory Kavka's example. See Kavka, 'The Toxin Puzzle', Analysis 43 (1983) 33-6.) will help you pass, you belief. So, all else being e not be equal. By hypothe the exam if you come to enough in itself to prom vinced that your current c you are to acquire the bel in a Pascalian manner so you can believe. This itse costs are great enough, t making it irrational, al plottings.
In any event, this is a side issue. The relevant point for epistemology is that this and the previous case illustrate that evidence and epistemic reasons for belief do not inevitably go hand-inhand. They can come apart. Since belief itself can create evidence, you can have an epistemic reason to believe a proposition for which you lack evidence, and since belief itself can destroy evidence, you can lack an epistemic reason to believe a proposition for which you do have evidence.
There is nonetheless a general, albeit more complicated, way in which evidence and epistemic reasons for belief are linked. They are subjunctively linked. Having adequate evidence for a proposition gives you an epistemic reason to believe it, unless believing the proposition would itself undermine the evidence. Correspondingly, if you don't have adequate evidence for a proposition, then you don't have an epistemic reason to believe it, unless believing it would itself create adequate evidence for it.7
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903, USA 7Compare with Richard Jeffrey's view that decisions must be ratifiable. See Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1983).
EPISTEMIC OBLIGATIONS AND DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM
By PHIL GOGGANS ACCORDING to one popular view of epistemic justification, one is justified in holding a particular belief if one has not violated any epistemic obligations in forming or sustaining that belief. This is generally known as the 'deontological conception of epistemic justification'. Proceeding on the 'Ought implies Can'
